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This paper is concerned with the dynamics of prices 
and wages in a simple closed macroeconomic system. It will be 
so to speak an internal dynamics as the exogeneous data charac­
terizing the economy such as population size, preferences, 
technological know-how, capital or resource availability will 
remain unchanged. Why should prices then change? Simply, 
because they have not yet reached their Walrasian market 
clearing values. In general equilibrium theory in that case 
one assumes the action of an invisible hand or of an auctioneer 
who adjusts prices so quickly to their market clearing levels 
that agents can postpone their trades until these prices have 
been found and established. This paradigm is known as tâton­
nement. It is, "however, powerless if we wish to take into 
account a phenomenon which is important in practice, i.e. 
the unemployment of resources (excess supply of labour, excess 
productive capacities, etc...) and can be observed in real 
economies no matter what their type of organization"
[Grandmont (1982), p.904].
If one is thus willing to abandon the hypothesis of instant­
aneous price adjustment one is led to alternative approaches, 
one of which is the following"non-tatônnementTime is divided 
into periods of equal length such that in each period t prices 
remain fixed at values pfc, say. At these prices trades take 
place. A possible imbalance of demands and supplies gives 
rise to a revision of prices at the end of the old or at the 
beginning of the new period. The revised prices pt+ remain 
fixed in period t+1, trades take place, and so on. In this 
way a sequence of prices and associated allocations is formed 




























































































The approach just described involves two fundamental 
problems. The first is to determine a consistent allocation 
when prices are "wrong", i.e. not at their Walrasian levels, 
and a solution has been provided by the concept of equilibrium 
with quantity rationing. Main contributions are due to 
Benassy (1975) and Dreze (1975) as far as a treatment in a 
general framework is concerned; and to Barro and Grossman 
(1971) and Malinvaud (1977) regarding the application of 
this concept to simple macroeconomic models.
The second problem concerns the adjustment of prices. Any 
adjustment mechanism should in some sense be based on the 
size of "disequilibrium" or the size of dissatisfaction of 
agents in an equilibrium with rationing. A measure for this 
size of disequilibrium in turn might be obtained by a compa­
rison of the desired trades or transaction offers with the 
actual trades. Thus Benassy (1976, 1978), Blad (1981),
Laroque (1981) and Veendorp (1975), among others, have 
studied models in which the value of the aggregate excess 
demand arising from Benassy's concept of effective demand 
[Benassy (1975)] is taken as such a measure. But, as has 
been pointed out by Grandmont (1977, p.563) and Green (1980, 
pp.341-42), this measure cannot be considered reliable. 
Furthermore, as has been shown by Weinrich (1984a), this 
criticism generally applies to any measure derived from 
effective demands based on deterministic rationing constraints. 
Stochastic rationing on the other hand admits the construction 
of a reliable measure of disequilibrium [Weinrich (1984c)] 
and can morever be justified by incomplete information of 
agents on the precise network of rationing in a large economy.
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the non-tatonnement 
approach with stochastic rationing in a most simple macro- 
economic model consisting of consumers, producers and a 
government who exchange consumption goods and labour services 
against money among each other. Though our model has no cla,im 




























































































the study of a more general
and realistic model, it nevertheless yields some interesting 
insights. The principal conclusion is that wage indexation 
may be desirable in order to stabilize the dynamic behaviour 
of the economy and to accelerate convergence to the Walrasian 
equilibrium. On the other hand, if the minimum real wage is 
too high, then the economy ends up in a state with persistent 
underemployment and no rationing on the goods market.
A remark is in order with respect to the treatment of money.
In order to isolate the effect of price dynamics, all other 
potentially dynamic variables must be kept constant. This 
applies in particular to the initial money balances of agents 
in a monetary economy where money serves as means for inter­
temporal transfer of wealth. But if one assumes ex cathedra 
that initial money balances are the same for agents in all 
periods, no matter what amount of money an agent held at 
the end of the previous period, then no agent has an incentive 
to transfer money and the assumption of intertemporal decision 
making of agents becomes empty. Therefore it seems better and 
more honest not to assume this but rather to model agents1 
behaviour as being atemporal. We will then justify the exis­
tence of "money" as a substitute for consumers' perfect for- 
sight of producers'profits.
In chapter two, the model is presented and the behaviour of 
consumers and producers under stochastic rationing is derived. 
Chapter three is concerned with the introduction of macro- 
economic equilibrium with stochastic rationinq, its unique 
existence, and the partitioning of the price-wage-plane into 
the regimes of different types of equilibria. In chapter 
four, finally, the dynamics of the system is set up and the 
above mentioned results are established. Concluding remarks 






























































































There are three types of agents: consumers, firms 
and a government. Each of the identical consumers supplies 
labour and demands a composite consumption good. Each of the 
identical firms demands labour services which it uses as 
only input in the production of the good. The government 
may demand consumption goods.
Economic activity takes place sequentially in
periods ...t-1, t, t+1 ... . A t  the outset of each period
t, the price pt of the consumption good and the wage rate
wt are fixed. Agents express their demands and supplies
and a feasible allocation obtains by means of an equilibrium
with rationing1. If prices were not Walrasian, then they are
revised at the end of period t on the basis of the imbalance
of aggregate demands and supplies. That is, if the aggregate
d seffective demand and supply in period t were L , L, on thed s t.labour market and Cfc, on the goods market, then new pri­
ces for period t+1 are determined according to adjustment 
rules
pt+1 = + (pt' Ct 7 c|>
wt+, = * (wt' 11 7 h V
The implementation and realization of these rules can be 
thought of to be performed by the government which is com­
missioned to do so by the agents in the economy in order to 
bring about eventually Walrasian equilibrium.




























































































In each period, the labour market opens first and then the 
consumption goods market. The rationing mechanism is stochas­
tic .
Since we will assume decreasing returns to scale of product­
ion, firms make positive profits which have to be distribut­
ed to consumers and which enter into their budget constraints. 
In order to avoid the informational problem arising from 
the requirement that consumers know ex post realized profits 
before they decide on their transaction offers (which in 
turn determine profits), consumers are assumed to receive a 
"money" balance mf > 0 at the outset of each period t. This 
mtbuys —  units of consumption goods and can be considered as
(nominal) "predistributed" profit income. Thus a consumer's 
budget constraint in period t reads
ptc « wtt + m t
mt has purchasing power in period t only. Its transfer to 
consumers can be thought of to be performed by the govern­
ment which also collects profits from firms. If Mt = n*mt 
(n = number of consumers) denotes the resulting aggregate 
money stock and (L̂ _, Ĉ _) the aggregate transaction levels on 
labour and goods market, then individual budget constraints 
imply for aggregate profits
nt = PtCt - „tLt < <ut V Mt> ■ wtLt = Mt
Thus profits are in fact completely distributed but it may 
be that consumers cannot spend all their money, namely if 
they are rationed on the goods market. In that case, left 
over money stocks become worthless. Finally, we assume 




























































































Since there is no possibility of intertemporal transfer of 
wealth, from the point of view of individual agents there 
is no link between different periods. Thus a decision in 
period t is taken independently of what might be expected 
to happen in periods t+1, t+2... .
As we will in the remainder of the chapter be concerned 
with individual decision making within a given period, we 
suppress for the time being time subscripts.
2.1. Consumers
Being endowed with £ time units of leisure, a 
consumer derives from consuming c units of goods and 
working £ units of time a utility u(c,£) := U(c,£-£)
where c and £ are subject to c >  0, 0 < £ < £ and 
pc < m + w£.
(3. S'A transaction pair (c,£) results from (c ,£ ), the consumer's 
goods demand and his labour supply, by means of a stochastic
r a '"'clrationing procedure. More precisely, we set X = ftin{L /L ,1} 
and assume that
*
£s with prob. Xs
£ =
0 with prob. 1-XS ,




























































































The realized purchase c then is assumed to be related to 
the demanded quantity c by means of
(1 )
with prob. pyd 
with prob. 1-py ,
where p e (0,1) is a fixed parameter of the rationing 
mechanism whereas a e [0,1] varies with yd according to
( 2 ) a =
d dy - py
1 - pyd
This specification of a is not arbitrary but follows from 
the short sided rule, i.e.
pydCd + (1-pyd )aCd = min {Cd ,CS} .
(1) and (2) imply that the expected transaction resulting 
from a demand cd and a rationing quota yd is
(3) Ec = ydcd .
Since the labour market opens first, the consumer knows whether 
he is employed or not before he has to express his demand 
on the goods market. The latter we denote with c, in case of 
employment and with c 0 in case of unemployment.
The expected utility function arising from the above made 
specifications is
,. s d d , s d. v (£ , c j , c o; X , y )
= X S[ pydu (cf, £S) + (1-pyd)u (acf, £S) ]




























































































,s ,.s d d. , .. , s« , d d.= : X Vj (£ ,cj;Y ) + (1-X )v0 (c0;y ) .
The maximization of this expression subject to
cf,c^ > 0 ,  0 < £S <  £, pcf < w£S+m and pc^ < m yields the
s dconsumer's effective labour supply £ (y ) and his effective 
d d d dgoods demands Ci(y ) and c 0(y ). In order to facilitate 
their computation, we make the following assumption.
(C) (i) u is increasing in c, decreasing in £ and 
strictly quasi-concave in (c,£).
(ii) u(c,£) > u(c', £) whenever c > 0, c' > 0 and
0 <  £ < I.
(iii) For all a > 0
a
3u d „s, 3u , d „s(ac ,£ )
3c
(c , £ )
3u , d ns. 3u , d ns.---(ac ,£ ) --- (c ,£ )
3 £* 3£‘
(C)(ii) insures that the consumer never wants to work the 
maximum amount of time physically possible for him.
(iii) entails that the labour supply is independent of p. 
This is illustrated in Fig. 1. The class of utility 





























































































Lemma 1. Under condition (C), the following statements hold,




u (w£+m P 7Z) .
s clIn particular, Z does not depend on y ,
(b) Zs does not depend on p.
s
(c) >0 whenever Zs > 0.





























































































Next we derive the loci of aggregate transaction offers 
and of expected aggregate transactions (in £-c-plane). 
These concepts will provide a useful diagrammatical 
representation both of the various types of equilibria 
with rationing and of the size of disequilibrium in these 
equilibria.
Since there are n identical consumers, aggregate labour
s ssupply is simply L = nî. . Aggregate goods demand depends 
on Xs and is
thus describes all aggregate transaction offers of consumers
Using (3), the locus of expected aggregate transactions is
It will be useful to introduce the following partitioning 
of H:
The locus
H := { (LS,Cd (XS) ) |XS e [ 0,1] }
sin response to varying rationing signals X .
H = { (XSLS,ydCd (XS) ) | (XS,yd) e [0,1]^
HrK := { (XSLS,Cd (XS) ) |X5 e [ 0,1[ }
HT H HC p H I dd n , s , y <1,X =1




























































































These loci are shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2
2.2. Firms
A firm's technology is described by a different­
iable, increasing, strictly concave production function f
satisfying f(0) = 0 and f'(0) = °°. An actual transaction
s (3.(c,£) results from a pair (c , £ ), the firm's effective
sconsumption goods supply c and its effective labour demand 




























































































In complete analogy to rationing of consumers, rationing of 
firms on the labour market is assumed to be all-or-nothing, 
whereas on the goods market it is described by
c
s sc with prob. py
<
s sac with prob. 1-py
with p G (0,1) fixed, yS = min {Cd/CS ,1} and a = (yS-pyS)/(1-pyS). 
If the firm is rationed on the labour market, it withdraws 
from economic activity in the prevailing period. If not, it 
realizes its effective labour demand being derived from 
maximizing expected profit, i.e. from
max [yspf(£d) - w£d]
£ d
s.t, 0 < £d < a-f(£d) .w
The upper bound on admissible values for labour demand
results from the requirement that the firm be able to
finance its labour purchases also in the case of rationing
on the goods .market. It will become irrelevant, however,
under the following assumption, in which we denote with 
d s£ (y ) an interior solution of the above problem.
(P)(i) The labour share in expected output is constant, i.e, 
ySpf (£d (yS))
----- -------  =; k
w£d (ys)





























































































Expected profit maximization and f'(0) = <» already imply 
k > 1. This fact is reinforced by (P) (ii), where p is the 
parameter referring to the rationing mechanism.
An example of a production function meeting (P) is
f U) = a£b, a > 0, 0 < b < 1-p
1in which case k = ^.
Lemma 2. Under assumption (P), the producer's decision problem 
possesses interior solutionsonly and these are characterized by
yspf ' U d) = w
Proof: k >  — —  >  ^ or ■■--~£— k >  1 , Multiplying this
1-p 1-p 1-PY
inequality with w£ and using (P)(i) yields
w£d <  _±1P^ kw*d = i !z £x ! ±  kw*d
1-PYS 1-PYS Y S
= a YSpf(^d) = apfUd) |
Y
The firm's effective consumption goods supply clearly is 
c S (y S) = f (Jld (yS) ) - Morever, d$,d/dYS > 0, dcS/dYS > 0 and 
£d (0) = 0 = cs (0) .
Assuming that there are n' identical firms, the aggregate 
effective labour demand is




























































































Since only the fraction Xd := min {LS/Ld ,1} of firms
will be able to buy labour, aggregate effective consumption
goods supply is
C (X ,y ) = X n'f U  (y )) .
Consequently, the set
F := {(Ld (yS) ,CS (Xd ,yS)) | (Xd ,yS) e [0,1]2}
describes the locus of all aggregate transaction offers in
d sresponse to varying signals X and y in L-C-plane. The 
following notations will be useful:
f k :=  F , d  ,  s  ' 
\  - 1 , y  <1
F 1 : =  P |  ^• cl . .. S -,
X < i , y  =1
F C : =  F 1 „ F ° :=  F I  ,
Xd = 1 , y s =1 Xd < 1 , y s <1 ,





























































































F coincides with that part of the aggregate production 
function n'f for which f '(£) > P
The locus of aggregate expected transactions of firms in
d sresponse to varying X and y in L-C-plane is given by
F := {(XdLd (YS),ySCS (Xd ,YS)) I (Xd ,yS) e [0,1] 2}
Defining
F := F | d s ' F := F|
X =1,Y <1 Xa<1,y =1
F° := F | , F° := F| .
Xd=1,y =1 , Xd <1,YS<1 ,
we have the following
~K ~ILemma 3. Under (P)(i), the loci F , F and F possess the
same parameterfree representation
FK = F1 = F° = { (L , k—L ) I 0 < L < Ld (1) }P
Proof : YSCS (Xd ,yS) = yS^dn ' f ( P  (yS) )
_ ,w ,d . .d, sN ,w.dTd, s. ■ = k-Xn'i (y ) = k-XL (y ) . |P P




























































































3. MACROECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM WITH RATIONING
3.1. Definition and Classification
Taking into account the government's consumption
goods demand G > 01, aggregate supplies and demands are
s d s dL and L on the labour market and C and CT+G on the goods market;s d SThese values result from rationing signals X , X and y gwhere we have to revise now the previous definition of y 
so that
s . jcd + GY - - . n j — —
s d sFor given y , firms' labour demand is L (y ) which, together
with consumers' labour supply, determines
Xs = min {Ld (yS)/Ls,1}
Xd = min {LS/Ld (yS),1}.
These quotas in turn induce a new value
min fcd (\s) r g 1
[  c s U d ,Y s )'
s s /"v/sIf y is such that y = y , then all agents are confirmed 
in their expectations concerning the rationing signals 
relevant to their decisions. Thus no agent has an incentive 
to revise his actual transaction offer. This leads to the 
following
1. The government pays pG to firms which however it gets 




























































































Definition. For given price p, wage w and government 
consumption G > 0, a pair (L,C) e 3R̂  is an equilibrium 
with quantity rationing if there exists a quadrupel 
(XS,Xd ,YS,Yd) e [0,1]  ̂ such that
L = XSLS = XdLd (yS)
C = YSCS (Xd ,YS) = YdCd (XS) + G 
(1-XS) (1-Xd) = 0 
(1-YS) (1-Yd ) = 0 .
The last two equations formalize the short-sided^
rule which is assumed here and which requires that at 
most one side of the market be rationed. Morever, they 
exclude the trivial equilibrium that would arise from 
Xs = Xd = YS = Yd = 0 in the case that G = 0.
s c3. s clBy means of the parameters X , X , Y and Y we can classify 
the various equilibrium states into the four well known 
types of Keynesian unemployment (K), Repressed inflation 
(I), Classical unemployment (C) and Underconsumption (U), 
according to table 1, In addition
K I C u
Xs <1 =1 <1 =1
x d =  1 <1 =  1 <1
YS <1 =  1 =  1 <1





























































































there exist intermediate cases, the most important of 
which is Walrasian equilibrium, at which all rationing 
parameters are equal to one.
Using the loci of aggregate effective demands and aggregate 
expected transactions derived in the previous sections, we 
can illustrate graphically
the various equilibrium states. Assuming first 
G = 0, a Keynesian unemployment equilibrium is according 
to Table 1 and the definition of the loci H and F given by an 
intersection of H and F , that is, by
(L,C) G { (ASLS,Cd U S) ) |0 < Xs < 1 }
n { (Ld (yS) , y sc s (1,y 3)) | 0 < YS < 1 )
= h k n Fk .
These loci were introduced in Figures 2 and 3 and are 





























































































s cllabour L > L and demand goods C = C, whereas producers 
d sdemand labour L = L and supply goods C > C. The result-
, , s L , , d „ s C, , d „ing quotas are X = / s, X =1, y = / s and y = ^JLi C
which are just the ones that lead consumers and producers
s dto express their aggregate transaction offers (L ,C ) and 
(L^,CS), respectively.
The diagram evidently shows that aggregate effective 
supplies of rationed agents exceed aggregate actual 
transactions.This is due to the uncertainty agents are 
facing with respect to the amount they can trade; it is 
in contrast to the concept of (contrained) effective 
demand under deterministic rationing as applied e.g. by 
Muellbauer and Fortes (1978) to the diagrammatical 
representation of the equilibrium with quantity rationing.
Moreover, these excesses can be used to get an indicator for 
the size of disequilibrium. Since there is all-or-nothingTrationing in the labour market, the value 1 - / s is justJ-4
the ratio of the number of unemployed consumers to the 
total number of consumers. But even if rationing were notgall-or-nothing, 1 - X could be looked at as a measure of 
the size of disequilibrium (in equilibrium) whenever it 
increases with a decrease of L, since a decrease of L, 
the total amount of labour available to consumers, means 
in an objective sense an aggravation of consumers' rationing 
in the labour market. But





























































































s s sSimilarly, from y C (1,y ) - C = 0  one obtains
d(1-yS) _ dys _
dC dC CS + Is
0 ,
since
—  (11 yS) = n'f ' (£d (yS) ) —  > 0
3y‘ dy*
A similar reasoning justifies an interpretation of the terms 
ci d1 - Xu and 1 - y as indicators for the size of disequilibrium 
in the various other regimes. For a general discussion 
and systematic treatment of this issue, the reader is referred 
to Weinrich (1984c).
In the case that G > 0, one can use the same diagrammatical 
representation by slightly modifying Figure 4, In Figure 5 
the Goverment's demand is taken into account by means of 





























































































Referring to Figures 2 and 3, one can similarly represent
the other types of equilibria, repressing for simplicity
and without loss of generality the goverment's contribution
G. This is done in Figure 6. It should be remarked that
any Underconsumption equilibrium can be considered as
limit case of a Keynesian unemployment equilibrium as
well as of a Repressed inflation equilibrium. Moreover,
in the Underconsumption case, the values of producers'
aggregate labour demand/goods supply are not uniquely
determined through the values of aggregate transactions
d s(L,C); rather, any demand (L ,C ) of the (uncountable) set
m / / - d ^ S .  [.d-d, T S_,S ,, d S . „T = { (L , C ) IX L (y ) = L,y C (X ,y ) - C 
for some (X^,y S) 6 [0,1]2}
is a possible aggregate transaction offer of producers.





























































































(c) Underconsumption (d) Walrasian Equilibrium
Figure 6
3.2. Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
Using the diagrammatic tools developped above, it 
is now immediate to see the existence of an equilibrium. In 
fact, a pair (L,C) G ]r£ is an equilibrium if it is an element 
of the set
/v/T7 /-w-r 7 'H' T(H n f ) u (h n f ) u (r n jr*) u (h n f )
~x ~xwhere H , F , X G {K,l}, denotes the topological closure of 
H , F , respectively. But since F = F starts from the origin 
whereas H and H do so from positive intercepts on the respec­
tive axes, the non-emptvness of the above set is evident from 
Figures 4 and 6.
Turning to the uniqueness of equilibrium, one first observes
that H runs to the left of H whereas F coincides with F .
Next, since all these loci are straight lines, their respec-




























































































at most once as the same is true for H and F . But this 
assures uniqueness since it entails that intersection of 
H and F excludes intersection of H and F , and vice versa.
3.3. Representation of Equilibrium Regimes in p-w-plane
Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium enable to 
divide up the p-w-plane into the four regions1 of different 
types of equilibria with quantity rationing according to 
Table 1. The result is shown in Figure 7, where (p*,w*) 
denotes the Walrasian price-wage-pair1 2. The partitioning 
shown in Figure 7 differs from those ones given in the
1 Since the "region" of underconsumption coincides with the 
border line between Keynesian unemployment and repressed 
inflation, there are actually three proper regions only.
2 Fig. 7 is drawn under the hypothesis that G > 0. If G = 0, 
then the border line between K and I is horizontal, as 




























































































literature in one aspect distinctively: the border line 
between Keynesian unemployment and repressed inflation has 
a non-negative slope whereas this does not hold for the 
partitionings shown in the literature1. To see this, we 
recall that for any price-wage-tuple (p,w) on the K-I- 
border line, households are not rationed. Thus an equilibrium 
for such a (p,w) fulfills
LS (p,w) = AdLd (ys,p,w)
Cd (1,p,w) + G = ySCs (Xd ,yS,p,w)
x V  < 1
where we have written explicitly p and w as arguments of 
the various functions in order to point out the dependence 
of these functions on p and w. By definition of F and 
Lemma 3, this implies (compare Fig. 6c)
Cd (1,p,w) + G = k ^ L S (p,w) 
or
n m t wt.S.W . u - k *  nts (w) = 0,
P P
where we have used the fact that labour supply is independent 
of p. Upon differentiation of this expression, one gets
dw _ - G
dp n (1 -k) [ Is (w) + w
d£swhich is positive since k > 1 and > 0 by (c) of Lemma 1.





























































































It is to be stressed here that the non-negative slope of the 
K/I - border line is not due to our treatment of money and 
the assumption of atemporal decision making of consumers 
but to stochastic rationing. In fact, in [Weinrich (1984b)] 
a model has been analyzed which differs from Malinvaud's 
(1977) model only by the fact that rationing is stochastic 
instead of being deterministic. That model gives rise to 






























































































So far our analysis was purely static. With each 
pair of prices (p,w) we have associated an equilibrium with 
quantity rationing, by this identifying the aggregate trans­
action levels, the rationed market sides, and, in terms of 
s d. s dthe quotas X , X , t and y , the size of disequilibrium in 
each market. We will now dynamize the model by considering 
a sequence of periods, in each of which an equilibrium with 
rationing obtains. The link between successive periods is 
given by price adjustment, that is, the prices in period 
t + 1 depend functionally on the prices in period t. With 
respect to the directions of price changes we follow the 
traditional hypothesis: excess supply gives rise to a 
decrease whereas excess demand makes them increase. Alter­
natively, we can express this using the rationing quotas




pt+1 < pt O
s
*t < 1
w. > w. X? < 1t+1 t t
wt+l < wt At < 1 .
This gives rise to the arrows in Fig. 7 indicating the 
respective directions of price changes.
A remark is in order with respect to pairs (p,w) which lie
s clon the border line between K and I. In that case, X = y = 1 
d s d sand X y < 1, but X and y are not uniquely determined.
d sOne possibility is X = 1 , y <‘ 1 , in which case only the 




























































































d s^heopposite extreme possibility is X < 1  and y = 1  which 
implies an adjustment of the wage rate only. For X < 1  andgy < 1  both prices change. This indeterminacy of price adjust­
ment is much less problematic, however, as it may appear at
first glance; because, whatever are the concretely realized 
cl svalues of X and y , p will never increase and w will never 
decrease. This, together with the fact that the K/I border 
line is positively sloped, implies that (p ,w, , ) e Kt~r j 1
whenever (pt,wt) e U, But this fact will be sufficient for 
the qualitative analysis that will follow.
From Fig. 7 it is immediate to see the behaviour of the 
dynamical system in the regions C and K: whereas C is a 
transient region, K is persistent, that is, whenever
) e k for some t, then (p ,w ) G k for all r P t, 
with convergence to the Walrasian point (p*,w*). On the 
other hand, the characterization of the inflationary region 
I with respect to the system's behaviour is not obvious. In 
orger to get some insight, we will be more precise now about 
the mapping (pt,wt) (Pt+iiwt+i) .
4.1. Dynamics in the inflationary region
For given G > 0, with each pair (pt,wt) e I there is associated 
a unique pair of rationing quotas
d d. ,,d, i d,U t rYt) = (X (pt ,wt) , y (pt ,wt)),
by means of the equilibrium conditions
LS (wt) = X^Ld (1,pt ,wt)




























































































Since there is excess demand on both markets, prices have 
to be increased. More precisely, we concentrate in the follow­
ing on adjustment functions of the type
(4) Pt+1 = ♦v<^> Pt
Wt+i = 4’p <>t> wt '
where and are families of functions
d) : ] 0,1 [ + [1,»[
ip :v l 0,1 [ + [ 1 ,«[
indexed by coefficients v and y reflecting speeds of adjust­
ment in a sense made precise by (ii) of the following assumption,
(D)(i) and $ are differentiable and
<j>' < 0 , il>' < 0.Tv ry
(ii) vj > v2 « <f>v (y) > 4>v (Y) v Y
y ! > y <=» \p (X) > ip (X) V X .
(iii) <f> (y ) = 1 V y / 41 (X) = 1 V X. o o
(iv) The functions <J>.(y ) = v cj>̂ (y ) and (X) : y ^ if̂ (X) 
are continuous in v = 0 and y = 0, respectively.
An example of a class of functions meeting (D) is
4>v (Y) = Y_V (X) = X y
































































































(b) if (p ,w ) G I, v > 0, y = 0, then (p,,w,) e i for all o o  t t
t = 1,2... and pfc -> °°. (c) If (po,wfl) G I, v > 0, then for 
any o > 0 there exists y > 0 such that for some t (p ,w ) g i_ T T
for all t < t and pfc > p.
Proof : Appendix.
According to this result, adjustment of the goods price 
only (i.e. v > 0 and y = 0) by (b) entails that the economy 
remains forever in the region of repressed inflation and 
that p increases explosively, the latter by (a). If p and w 
are adjusted, then, for any given speed of adjustment of 
p and for any given high price p, there exists a sufficiently 
small (but non-zero) speed of adjustment of w such that the 
economy reaches in some period t a state in which pt is higher 
than p. Thus, even if both prices are adjusted, the trajectory 
of the system may be very undesirable from the point of view 
of economic a,gents.
3y 1The essential fact driving the result is that - (p,w) < 0
whenever (p,w) g i . Thus, if there is demand rationing in 
the goods market, p is augmented; but instead of relaxing 
rationing, the increase in price reinforces rationing, as is 
reflected by a decrease of y . This in turn leads to a still 
higher price increase. The process continues as long as the 
economy remains in the regime of repressed inflation. 1





























































































It may be instructive to visualize the effect of a price 
increase in L-C-plane. In Figure 8
Figure 8
we have represented two situations of equilibrium under 
repressed inflation, arising from two prices Pj ,p , with 
p t < p 2. Variables indexed by i refer to p^. The rationing 
parameters for the goods market belonging to the two situa-d ^
tions are y . = C ./C.. Since p > p , aggregate consumption i l l  2 i  d d
goods demand is smaller for p^ than for , that is C 2 < Cj .
On the other hand, an increase in p increases the labour 
demand of each firm. But as supply of labour remains uneffected, 




























































































turn entails that aggregate supply of goods decreases -and 
hence the aggregate transaction level-, that is, C 2 < C2 . 
Moreover, aggregate supply decreases relatively more thand ^ d d
aggregate demand, that is, y^ = C^/C^ < C^/C^ = y^ .
4.2. Stabilization through Wage Indexation
The foregoing proposition shows that the dynamic behaviour 
of the economy considered in our model is not very satisfact­
ory. Indeed, even if the sequence of equilibria with quantity 
rationing eventually converges to the Walrasian equilibrium, 
it may follow a path on which occur very high prices and 
strong demand rationing on the goods market. This is in 
particular the case if the wage rate adjusts slowly compared 
to the goods price - an assumption that is often attributed 
to Keynes.
On the other hand, an inspection of Fig.7 suggests that the 
inconvenience of the dynamic behaviour in the inflationary 
regime can easily be removed by indexing the wage rate on 
the goods price. Thus, let W > 0 denote a suitably to be 
chosen real wage rate. Assuming that every (pt ,wt) occuring 
in time has to obey
wfc > Wpt ,
this will prevent the economy from getting too far away from 
the Walrasian equilibrium and will shorten the time needed to 
come close to it. More precisely, we define for any given 
(Pt/Wt) the new prices (Pt+1'wt+1) by
Pt+1 = V Y? )pt(5)




























































































The impact of this wage indexation is shown in Fig. 9 for 
some W < /p*‘ Assume that the price-wage combination
Figure 9
prevailing in period t is given by point A and that the 
subsequent price-wage pair that would result from applying 
the "uncorrected" rules (4) is represented by point B. Then 
(5) tells us to go to point B'. Analogously, starting from 
B', (5) would determine C' instead of C as would have been
prescribed by (4), and so on, until the sequence of equili­
bria reaches the regime of Keynesian Underemployment, with 




























































































What happens if the minimum real wage W lies above the
w ̂Walrasian real wage / * ? To answer this question, we 
consider Fig. 10. There the economy is assumed to find
Figure 10
itself in period t in point A. Instead of going to point B 
in period t+1, (5) tells us to go to B', The next point to
be realized will be C', and so on. The process converges to 
point P, where the dynamic evolution stops. P represents a 
price and wage combination where there is no rationing on the 
goods market and supply rationing on the labour market.
This result does not depend on the fact that the original 




























































































In fact, if (p0,w0) is any starting point such that °/ <  W,
Pothen (5) entails that w : = Wpj. But then again, convergence 
to P occurs. Thus, whenever the minimum real wage W is fixed 
above the Walrasian real wage, the economy gets stuck in a 
situation with persistent unemployment and no rationing on 
the goods market.
The question may arise whether one can’'cure this unemployment 
situation by changing money endowments of consumers m and/or 
goverment spending G. The answer is no. With respect to m, 
this is easily seem from Fig.11, where (p?,w|), i =1,2, 
correspond to two values m L and m 2 such that <  m 2. Chan­
ging m does not change the Walrasian real wage. Thus, if W 
is higher than that value, Walrasian equlibrium is not attain­
able whatever is the value of m. With a similar consideration 






























































































Though the model presented in this paper is a 
most simple one, it allowed us to illustrate how stochastic 
rationing can be used to set up and analyze price dynamics.
As a result it turned out that wage indexation may be desirable 
in order to stabilize the dynamic behaviour of the economy.
On the other hand, a too high minimum real wage in our model 
gives rise to persistent unemployment.
Further extensions of the analysis conducted in the text are 
perhaps worth to be mentioned. Introducing nominal wage rigi­
dity downwards (i.e. wt+1 >  wt for all t) will lead to per­
sistent unemployment (and no rationing on the goods market) 
as was the case with wage indexation with a too high minimum 
real wage. This can easily be seen from Fig. 7 and is due to 
the positivity of the slope between the K- and the I-region. 
Furthermore, the higher is government spending, the steeper 
is the slope of the K/I-border line; hence the larger will be 
underemployment in the resulting rest point. But, in contrast 
to the case of a too high minimum real wage, this underemploy­
ment situation can (temporarily) be removed by increasing money 
endowment m.
In order to make the model more realistic, one could think 
of the following modifications. First, one could distinguish 
between two types of consumers, workers and capitalists, the 
latter receiving all profits. This would allow to take into 
account the distributional aspects of wage indexation. Second, 
one could introduce an overlapping generations structure. 
Through this, money becomes a means of store of value and it 
would loose the somewhat artificial character that it has in 
the present paper. This would, as a third point, imply to 
include the dynamics of money into the analysis. As a conse­
quence, it will become difficult to describe trajectories 
explicitly, but the stability of the Walrasian equilibrium, 























































































































































































Proof of Lemma 1: By (C)(i), statement (d) of Lemma 1 is 
trivial. In order to show (a), we consider the problem
max v (£S,cd ;yd) 
s.t. cd > 0
0 < £S < £ 
pcd <  w£S + m
where v i(£S,cd ;yd ) = py\i(cd ,£S) + (1-pyd )u(acd ,£S).
(C)(i) and (ii) imply that a solution is characterized by 
the conditions
(la) [- ^  (£S,cd ;yd) + — L (£s,cd ;yd )] £S = 0 
p 8c 9£
(2a) W 8vi , s d d. 9vi , s d d. v, ns > n -----r (£ ,c ;y ) + --- (£ ,c ;y ) > 0, £ > 0
p 9c 9£
By definition of v , the term in square brackets in (la) is 
equal to
w






, d .s. , .. d(c , £  ) + (1 —py
, d .s. , ,. d,(c , £  ) + ( 1 - p y  )
) a — (acd , £S) ] 
9c
9u H e
— - (ac ,£ ) .
9£
Using (C) (iii), this expression can be transformed to become
9u , d .s, — s (ac , £ )
w 9u - d „s> f d d. 9£ ■,-- — z (c ,£ ) [py + (1-py ) -----------— ]




























































































- A 2 -
9u , d .s,-- jj ( OtC , £ )
+ (cd ,£s) [ pyd + (1-pyd ) a — ----------
”  -52, (cd ,ts)
3 c
-i k [ÏÏ 4 “ (cd,ls) + 4iL (Cd ,ts)] 
p 3c 3
with kj > 0. Hence (la) and (2a) are equivalent to
w 9u (cd ,£S) + 9u (cd ,Hs)] £S = 0
p 9cd 9 £S
' 9u
. d » 9c
(cd,is) 3u+ — —
9 £S
(cd ,ls) > 0, £S > 0,
d. swhich, together with c = (w£ +m)/p, are precisely the condi­
tions characterizing a solution to the program started in (a) 
of Lemma 1.
/V/ 'j
In order to see (b), consider p, p such that p = — pm a
with 0 < a < 1. Let (c , £ ) such that
— -52, (Cd ,is) + 42- (c = o
p 9c 3r
Then, using (C)(iii)
2 42, (acd ,ts) + 42- (acd ,
p 9c 9 £ ‘





































































































_ i, rw 3U /„d „sx , 3u , d „svl - l---- j (c ,£ ) + --- (c ,£ )] = 02 _ dp 3c 3jr
d s ~Thus (ac , £ ) maximizes utility for (p,w) and in particulars£ is independent of p.





























































































In Fig. la, the point A = (£-£s (w) ,cd (w) ) represents the 
solution to the consumer's preference maximization problem 
for a wage rate w (and a price p) which gives rise to the 
budget line BC. The line BC on the other hand represents 
the budget line for some wage w > w (and the same price p), 
By (C)(iii), the slope of the indifference curve passing 
through point A is equal to the slope of the straight line 
BD which (in absolute value) is smaller than the slope of 
the line BC. Thus A is not the utility maximizer for w but
'-'w/
it is some point A which, by strict quasi-concavity of the 
utility function, lies to the left (and above) A. Thus 
£S (w) > £S (w) . |




♦v 357 Pt + W
Using Lemma 3,
C-G nk-£S (w)-G
Y (p,w) = -g-------  = — 2-------
C (1,p,w) w£ (w)+m 
n P
kw£S (w) _ ____ pG_____
w£s(w)+m n(w£S (w)+m)
9YdThis implies -g-p- < 0 with inequality if G > 0. Recalling
that <p' < 0  and <j> (yd) > 1, this vieldsT v v t
dpt+1 




























































































(b) Since w, = w„ for all t, the conclusion is immediatet o
by (a) and the fact that the border line between K and I 
has a non-negative slope.
(c) Setting
<J>v (p,w):= <j>v (yd (p,w) ) p
~ (3.^ (p,w):= ^ ( A  (p,w)) w,
prices in period t can be written
(Pt ,wt) = (♦v ,*1J)t <P,,W()
By (D)(iv), the function
)t(p0,wQ) : y -(pt,wt)
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